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INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of our antitrust jurisprudence lies the notion that 
competition is good and monopolies are bad.1 A recent district 
court decision in United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc. supports this 
doctrine.2 The district judge prohibited a merger between the two 
largest rating and review (“R&R”) companies, Bazaarvoice and 
PowerReviews, because it would have given Bazaarvoice a mono-
poly in the industry.3 The antitrust laws and government-issued 
Merger Guidelines that were relied upon in this decision aim to 
prohibit anticompetitive behavior in large part to eliminate adverse 
effects on society.4 This Note proposes that the R&R industry 
might better serve society by allowing monopolistic behaviors ra-
ther than promoting competition. 
Part I of this Note will provide background information on anti-
trust law, on the Bazaarvoice decision, and on the unique features 
of two-sided platforms. Part II explores the efficiencies and benefits 
that may justify monopolistic behavior in the R&R field, mainly 
that ratings might be more accurate with fewer firms in the market. 
Finally, Part III presents additional solutions to increase the accu-
racy and transparency of ratings. In conclusion, this Note suggests 
that three of the generally acknowledged exceptions to basic anti-
trust principles are present in the R&R industry, and it argues that 
the Bazaarvoice court could have allowed the merger. 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
2 No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
3 See id. at *76. 
4 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (“Agencies normally evaluate 
mergers based on their impact on customers.”). 
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I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS USED TO ANALYZE THE R&R 
INDUSTRY 
Before understanding why a firm in the R&R industry may be 
justified in engaging in anticompetitive behavior, it is important to 
discuss the general topics on which this theory is premised. Part 
I.A will set out basic antitrust principles. Part I.B will discuss cha-
racteristics of R&R providers and the Bazaarvoice decision, and 
Part I.C will explain characteristics of two-sided platforms. 
A. The Antitrust Framework 
Antitrust laws set out to protect competition.5 They do so by 
prohibiting firms from agreeing to restrain trade in some way (i.e., 
fixing prices), and by prohibiting monopolistic behaviors.6 Section 
7 of the Clayton Act specifically regulates monopolies by prohibit-
ing mergers where the effect “may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”7 
Typically, antitrust claims will only be fruitful if a firm has 
market power,8 meaning it has the ability to profitably raise prices 
above the competitive level.9 Market power is determined by the 
firm’s market share.10 Before calculating the market share of a firm, 
the market, which consists of both the product market and the geo-
graphical market, must be defined.11 
The product market must first be decided, usually by applying 
the “reasonable interchangeability” test.12 This test posits that a 
                                                                                                                            
5 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963). 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
7 Id. § 18. 
8 Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 242 (1987) (“Most antitrust rules require the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant has or is likely to obtain ‘market power’ . . . .”). 
9 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981). 
10 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 81–82 (3d ed. 2005). 
11 See SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 
1999) (“The purpose of defining a relevant market is to assist in determining whether a 
firm has market power.”). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82 (1992). 
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product market should include the product in question as well as 
any product that is reasonably interchangeable with the product in 
question.13 The purpose of this test is to figure out what other op-
tions consumers would turn to if the provider of the relevant good 
increased its prices.14 Those goods that a consumer would buy are 
to be included within the market, and those goods that a consumer 
would not buy are to be excluded.15 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (discussed below) set out a 
“hypothetical monopolist” test to determine which products are 
considered reasonably interchangeable.16 This test asks: if a hypo-
thetical monopolist increased the price of its service by a small but 
significant amount, to what other goods would consumers turn?17 
In application, the agencies most often apply a hypothetical five 
percent increase in price,18 and they look to history of customer 
price changes, information from customers, and any other reasona-
bly available and reliable evidence to predict the effects of such a 
price increase.19 
The relevant geographic market can only be defined after the 
product market is determined.20 It includes geographical areas 
where a purchaser would go to buy a product or obtain services if a 
firm closer to him/her raises its prices by a small but significant 
amount.21 The Merger Guidelines suggest using the hypothetical 
monopolist test for this as well, usually applying the hypothetical 
five percent increase in prices.22 
                                                                                                                            
13 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.1.1 (“The Agencies use the 
hypothetical monopolist test to identify a set of products that are reasonably 
interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging firms.”). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. § 4.1.2.  
19 See id. § 4.1.3.  
20 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.2 
(1992, rev.1997), [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
21 See, e.g., Surgical Care Ctr. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist., 309 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2002). 
22 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, at § 4.2.1. 
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The ease in which a new firm can enter the market is also rele-
vant to the discussions concerning the product and geographic 
market of a good or service.23 If firms that are not yet a part of the 
market are presumed to restrain trade because it is so easy for them 
to enter and thereby constrain prices of incumbent firms, they 
could also be included within the market.24 Defining the market 
accurately is extremely important to the merger analysis because an 
overly narrow definition will exaggerate anticompetitive harms 
while an overly broad definition will underestimate harms.25 
Usually a challenger must prove something in addition to show-
ing that a firm has the requisite market share to win its claim.26 It 
must also prove that the firm engaged in some sort of anticompeti-
tive behavior.27 For collusion claims, this means the firm formed an 
agreement with another firm that restrains trade in some way.28 
For a monopoly claim, this means that the firm engaged in some 
sort of exclusionary behavior.29 If, however, the monopoly chal-
lenge is to a merger, it is only necessary to show that exclusionary 
activity is likely to result from the merger.30 The rest of this Note 
will analyze antitrust law in the context of merger challenges. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act allows the government to monitor 
merging firms, and, where acquisitions are valued in excess of 
$75.9 million,31 it requires that the merger be reported.32 A merger 
will usually be prohibited only where it is likely to have anticompe-
titive effects.33 Usually this means that the merger will result in the 
firm increasing its prices, decreasing its output or quality, or harm-
                                                                                                                            
23 See United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984). 
24 See id. 
25 See United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
26 Surgical Care Ctr., 309 F.3d at 839. 
27 See id. 
28 See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 8, at 261. 
29 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (1982). 
31 See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 3814 (Jan. 23, 2014). This figure is revised annually. 
32 See Premerger Notification Program, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
premerger-notification-program (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). 
33 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1. 
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ing consumers in some other manner.34 When a merger gives the 
firm monopoly power this establishes a rebuttable presumption 
that the merger creates anticompetitive effects.35 This concept, 
known as “unilateral effects,” is the idea that the merger enhances 
market power just by eliminating competition between the merging 
firms and, thus, violates antitrust law.36 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began issuing Merger 
Guidelines in 1968 in order to describe the principles and standards 
the Agency used to analyze mergers.37 More recently the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) has assisted in developing these 
Guidelines.38 The Guidelines do not serve as binding law; rather, 
they are intended to “help the agencies identify and challenge 
competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interfe-
rence with mergers that either are competitively beneficial or likely 
will have no competitive impact on the marketplace.”39 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which apply to merging 
firms that are horizontal competitors (as opposed to firms that are 
vertically aligned in the supply chain), have been amended on mul-
tiple occasions to account for changes in the economy and the ac-
tual practices of the Agencies.40 Most recently, the Guidelines 
were amended by the DOJ and FTC in 2010.41 
The new guidelines emphasize that a merger analysis is ulti-
mately about its effects on the marketplace.42 Specifically, the 
guidelines suggest that the Agencies “evaluate mergers based on 
                                                                                                                            
34 See id. 
35 See id. § 2.1.3. 
36 See id. § 6. 
37 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.htm. 
38 See Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice 
Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2010/08/federal-trade-commission-and-us-department-justice-
issue-revised. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in 
Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 56 (2010). 
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their impact on customers.”43 In other words, mergers that will 
hurt consumers are bad, while mergers that will help or have no 
impact on consumers are good, or at least permissible.44 
Thus, in addition to prohibiting anticompetitive behavior, anti-
trust laws also aim to promote positive effects in the marketplace.45 
When these concepts come into tension with each other, a pro-
competitive justification may be able to outweigh a firm’s anticom-
petitive behavior.46 Examples of such justifications include beha-
vior that creates efficiencies or other benefits to society.47 
The Guidelines encourage the Agencies to examine the effects 
of a merger on the direct and, when applicable, the indirect cus-
tomers of the merging parties.48 Absent evidence to the contrary, 
the Agencies are to assume that mergers adversely affecting direct 
customers also adversely affect indirect customers.49 Problemati-
cally, the Guidelines do not provide direction on how to analyze a 
merger that affects direct customers differently than indirect cus-
tomers.50 This Note presents the idea that in some two-sided mar-
kets, the direct and indirect customers are affected differently and 
may need to be considered differently to best serve society. 
As discussed above, the prosecuting agencies use the Merger 
Guidelines to determine whether or not they should take action 
against a particular merger.51 While a court will consider the Guide-
lines favorably, it will likely employ its own burden-shifting analy-
sis. First, it will require the government to establish that the merger 
will create anticompetitive effects.52 If this is satisfied, the burden 
will shift to the defending party to show that the effects are not an-
                                                                                                                            
43 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1. 
44 See id. 
45 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1979). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See Press Release, FTC, supra note 38. 
52 See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*64 (ND Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
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ticompetitive or to discredit the government’s assertions.53 If this is 
successful, the burden shifts again to the government to persuade 
the court of the potential anticompetitive harms.54 
B. Bazaarvoice, Power Reviews, and the Rating and Review Industry 
In January 2013, the DOJ challenged the merger between e-
commerce companies Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews based on the 
theory that the merger would give Bazaarvoice a monopoly in the 
R&R industry.55 The court found for the DOJ and prohibited the 
merger.56 
1. The Industry 
R&R platforms are online mechanisms used by businesses to 
communicate with their consumers, allowing the consumer to rate 
products, leave a review, and ask questions. 57 These systems bene-
fit product manufacturers and retailers by allowing them to com-
municate with customers and answer their questions,58 to syndicate 
ratings among businesses,59 and to increase brand loyalty among 
consumers.60 The online consumer interaction stimulates web traf-
fic and can lead to increased sales.61 
These systems also allow consumers to communicate with one 
another by posting their opinions about particular products, servic-
es, restaurants, and other commodities on the Internet.62 Consum-
ers often rely on these posts when making purchasing decisions.63 
                                                                                                                            
53 See id. 
54 See FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
55 See Complaint at *5–6, United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., 2014 WL 203966 (ND 
Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (No. C13-0133). 
56 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *65. 
57 See id. at *5–6 
58 See id. at *26. 
59 See id. at *6. 
60 See BAZAARVOICE: CONVERSATIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/conver
sations/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
61 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *7. 
62 See Louis Camassa, Analyzing Customer Review Platforms; Amazon’s Example, 
PRACTICALECOMMERCE (Apr. 5, 2002), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/
articles/3464-Analyzing-Customer-Review-Platforms-Amazon-s-Example. 
63 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *66. 
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In fact, 70 percent of shoppers read such reviews before buying,64 
and 92 percent of consumers trust recommendations from other 
consumers above all forms of advertising.65 Thus, these systems 
help consumers to be confident in their buying decisions.66 
Because of these benefits, many businesses choose to integrate 
R&R platforms onto their websites.67 In doing so, they can choose 
to make their own, in-house system or they can purchase the tech-
nology from a commercial provider.68 The Bazaarvoice and Po-
werReviews R&R platforms provide these services and can be re-
tained by a business to integrate R&R technology onto the compa-
ny website.69 
2. The Decision 
At trial, the DOJ presented evidence that Bazaarvoice execu-
tives considered PowerReviews its “fiercest competitor” and was 
“challenging [Bazaarvoice’s] price points.”70 Based on this and 
other evidence that established the merger would eliminate Ba-
zaarvoice’s competition, the government met its initial burden, 
creating a rebuttable presumption that the merger would cause a 
monopoly and anticompetitive effects.71 
Bazaarvoice tried to rebut the argument by alleging that it did 
not have a significant enough share of the market to have monopoly 
power because there is a “broad array” of other interactive com-
merce options for businesses.72 The Court disagreed with this de-
                                                                                                                            
64 See BAZAARVOICE: CONNECTIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/ conn-
ections/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *7. 
68 See Complaint, supra note 55, at *5–6. 
69 See BAZAARVOICE, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions (last visited Sept. 9, 
2014). 
70 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *11. 
71 See id. at *65 (“As stated at the outset of the Memorandum Opinion, the 
government easily established its prima facie case and Bazaarvoice was unable to rebut the 
presumption of illegality.”). 
72 See Pre-Trial Brief for Defendant (Redacted) at *30, Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966 
(No. C13-0133). 
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fense, finding that the market consisted of only R&R platforms and 
no other e-commerce businesses.73 
However, it is not clear that the court was right in defining the 
market in such narrow terms. Bazaarvoice advertises its services as 
a way for companies to stimulate interest in products and increase 
sales by allowing them to communicate with their end-users.74 Ba-
zaarvoice recognizes that its service is only one of many platforms 
that businesses can turn to in order to engage with their custom-
ers.75 Alternatives include Q&A dialogues and other forums where 
retailers can collect feedback.76 Companies often use social net-
working sites like Facebook and Twitter exclusively for these 
communication features,77 and some of these sites or a combination 
of sites may complement each other to some degree.78 
However, even when the court defined the market narrowly to 
only include R&R systems, it may have overstated Bazaarvoice’s 
market share of the R&R industry. As it presented at trial, Bazaar-
voice must compete with in-house R&R platforms,79 a factor to 
which the court gave little weight. Many companies have imple-
mented in-house solutions and, considering the ease with which 
the platforms can be created, many more can. 
Notably, Bazaarvoice had previously lost customers who 
created in-house systems, and some created these solutions in a 
matter of days or weeks, demonstrating how low the barriers are to 
entering the field.80 Companies like Amazon have the means to 
                                                                                                                            
73 See id. at *66. 
74 See BAZAARVOICE, http://www.bazaarvoice.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) 
(emphasizing the ability customers have to respond to posts by users and showing how 
increased dialogue leads to more sales). 
75 See Pre-Trial Brief for Defendant, supra note 72, at *30. 
76 See id. 
77 See Melanie Haselmayr, Tips And Tricks To Manage Your Social Media Campaigns 
Like A Pro, FORBES (MAY 16, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/
2014/05/16/tips-and-tricks-to-manage-your-social-media-campaigns-like-a-pro/. 
78 See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*26 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
79 See Post-Trial Brief for Defendant at *5, Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966 (No. C13-
0133). 
80 See id. 
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quickly enter the market.81 In fact, Amazon testified that it consid-
ers entering the industry “almost daily.”82 These providers of 
R&R could compete with Bazaarvoice and limit their ability to 
create adverse effects for consumers.83 Still, the court rejected 
them as viable competitors.84 
C. Characteristics of Two-Sided Platforms 
Because R&R platforms are two-sided, there might be other 
justifications for why the merger could have been permitted. Two-
sided platforms (“2SPs”) are markets “with two distinct sets of 
consumers, such as buyers and sellers, who wish to transact with 
one another but lack efficient means of organization.”85 R&R plat-
forms are two-sided in that they serve companies that retain R&R 
services as well as the businesses’ consumers who rely on ratings 
when making purchasing decisions.86 
Two-sided markets create network effects.87 This is the notion 
that the value of a system increases as the number of users of the 
system increases.88 A prototypical example of this phenomenon is 
the telephone. A single telephone owner values his telephone more 
as others purchase their own phones and the first owner can call 
more people.89 
In two sided-markets, network effects are seen in one side of 
the market when more users join the other side, and are referred to 
as cross-group network effects.90 For example, in R&R platforms, 
end-users who rely on ratings when making purchasing decisions 
are benefitted more as the number of companies providing review 
                                                                                                                            
81 See id. at *7. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
85 Daniel M. Tracer, Overcharge but Don’t Overestimate: Calculating Damages for 
Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 808 (2011). 
86 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *6–7. 
87 See Kristine Laudadio Devine, Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative 
Markets, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 59, 80–81 (2008). 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
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platforms increases and there are more available reviews.91 Similar-
ly, the companies gain value as more end-users read product re-
views because this leads to more purchases.92 
2SPs can seek compensation from users on each side of the 
market.93 In some cases, both users pay equally to benefit from the 
platform. 94 For example, many dating sites charge equal member-
ship rates for men and women, because both parties are, in theory, 
benefitting equally from joining. 95 
In other 2SPs, a firm requires that one side of the market fully 
subsidizes the other in order to maximize profits, allowing the 
second side to benefit from the service for free or better.96 R&R 
companies are examples of these types of markets. The business 
hiring the R&R provider pays for this technology while the end-
user benefits at no cost.97 This unique characteristic might require 
a different antitrust analysis because the R&R platform is only fi-
nancially responsible to the businesses that purchase the R&R 
technology. 
II. CREATING SOCIETAL BENEFITS THROUGH MONOPOLY 
This Note suggests that monopolies should be permitted in the 
R&R industry. This theory is premised on the idea that monopolies 
would create benefits for society in these contexts. Part II.A dis-
cusses why a monopoly would create more efficient results from 
the industry by increasing the amount of product output through 
                                                                                                                            
91 Devine, supra note 87, at 79–80. 
92 United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (noting that there is a thirty percent increase in sales for products 
that have been reviewed, when compared to those that have not been rated, even when 
those reviews are negative). 
93 David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate 
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 675 (2005). 
94 See id. 
95 See, e.g., Cost Comparison: Internet Dating Sites, REAL SIMPLE, http://www.real
simple.com/work-life/money/cost-comparison-internet-dating-sites-00000000028239/ 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
96 See Devine, supra note 87, at 59, 82; see also Evans & Noel, supra note 93, at 668. 
97 See BAZAARVOICE: CONNECTIONS, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/
connections/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
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syndication. Part II.B discusses how monopolies can foster innova-
tion, and Part II.C explains how monopolistic behavior in this field 
can increase the accuracy of the ratings. 
A. Network Effects and Syndication 
The network effects of R&R platforms are stronger when busi-
nesses are using the same R&R provider.98 This is because of the 
possibility of syndication.99 
Syndication occurs where content on one site is made available 
on another.100 Bazaarvoice technology allows reviews posted on 
one company’s site to appear on the websites of other companies 
that sell the reviewed product.101 For example, someone reading 
reviews on Home Depot’s website can presumably see the review 
posted on Lowes’ website. This benefits businesses that may pub-
lish a greater amount of R&R, and it benefits consumers who have 
access to a greater amount of R&R. The existence of multiple com-
petitors threatens this efficiency.102 Because a concentrated market 
increases syndications, and syndication increases network effects, 
it is possible that one firm’s monopoly in the industry may create 
societal benefits strong enough to outweigh the anticompetitive 
behavior.103 
B. Innovations and Free Riding 
Another reason for allowing monopolistic behavior in the R&R 
industry could be the importance of innovation. Some theorize that 
competition promotes innovation by forcing firms to maximize 
                                                                                                                            
98 See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*8, *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
99 See id. at *20. 
100 See Review Syndication, POWERREVIEWS, http://www.powerreviews.com/review-
syndication/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (“The PowerReviews Syndication Network 
distributes your reviews to all major retailers and search engines.”). 
101 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *6. 
102 The Bazaarvoice opinion presents this idea as one of the reasons that Bazaarvoice 
wanted to acquire PowerReviews on the theory that PowerReviews was stealing 
Bazaarvoice clients and thus taking away its competitive advantage of syndication. 
However, syndication benefits society and can therefore be used as a reason why 
anticompetitive behavior in this case may be acceptable. See id. at *11–13. 
103 See id. at *51. 
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profits.104 Others, however, propose that a dominating firm can fos-
ter innovation more so than firms in competition.105 
Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “creative destruction” asserts 
that while a firm is dominating, it will be willing to invest in innova-
tion,106 a risk that would dissuade competitive firms because of the 
fear that others would piggyback off of new ideas.107 The theory 
further purports that the domination is not dangerous because the 
market leader will eventually be displaced.108 Others have sup-
ported this argument by advocating that antitrust rules should not 
apply when innovation is at stake.109 This theory is based on the 
premise that a firm wants to stop others from free riding off of its 
investments. This is generally accepted in antitrust law as a pro-
competitive defense, and perhaps in this case poses a possible justi-
fication for encouraging a single firm to dominate.110 
The major concern that a court might have with a procompeti-
tive theory is that the effects are usually only justified when the 
monopolistic behavior has continued for a period of time.111 For 
example, if Bazaarvoice were trying to exclude PowerReviews from 
a market of which PowerReviews was not originally a part, the free 
riding justification might be accepted as procompetitive.112 Howev-
er, because the R&R market operated competitively while Bazaar-
voice and PowerReviews were acting individually, procompetitive 
justifications are likely to have less merit.113 
                                                                                                                            
104 See David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 732 (2001). 
105 See Devine, supra note 87, at 99–100. 
106 See id. at 99. 
107 See id. at 100. 
108 See id. at 99–100. 
109 See Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON., 915, 966 (2008). 
110 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007). 
111 Compare Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 
(2004), with Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
112 See Verizon Comm., 550 U.S. at 409. 
113 See Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 585. 
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C. Credit Rating Agencies and Why Ratings Become Less Accurate 
The credit rating industry is another example of a 2SP, and it 
shares many qualities with the R&R market.114 CRAs evaluate the 
creditworthiness of firms (“issuers”) by assessing their ability to 
pay back their debts in a timely manner.115 This evaluation is re-
ported as a “credit rating” that is usually a letter- and number-
based estimate of risk.116 Investors rely on credit ratings before pro-
viding an issuer with capital.117 If a credit rating is high, as opposed 
to low, investors are more likely to contribute to that issuer because 
he is more likely to get a return on his investment.118 
Because of this, issuers want high credit ratings so that inves-
tors are willing to supply them with capital.119 Investors, who rely 
on an entity’s credit rating when deciding how to invest, want the 
rating to be accurate in order to know where to invest.120 These de-
sires might not be consistent. 
Originally, the credit rating industry only hosted two main 
agencies: Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.121 Around 1989, Fitch 
started to become a major CRA as well, and the firms are currently 
considered the “Big Three” agencies.122 Upon Fitch’s entry to the 
market, the accuracy of ratings began to decline, and research sug-
gests this is because CRAs are more accurate when there is less 
competition.123 
                                                                                                                            
114 Compare SEC, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
Operation of the Securities Markets 21 (2003), with Tracer, supra note 85, at 808. 
115 SEC, supra note 114, at 21. 
116 Julia Zukina, A Step Short of Change: Examining the Recent Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies and Its Shortcomings in a Global Market, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 259, 261–62 (2013). 
117 See SEC, supra note 114, at 21. 
118 See id. at 27. 
119 See id. 
120 Where an investor has already invested under the guise of an inaccurate rating, he 
does not want the credit rating of that entity to downgrade even if that means it will 
continue to be inaccurate. Mark Patterson, Looking at Credit-Rating Agencies Through a 
Leegin Lens, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 2 (2014). 
121 See SEC, supra note 114, at 5. 
122 Zukina, supra note 116, at 264. 
123 Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings? 4 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2010). 
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Various studies have been conducted to explain why the pres-
ence of Fitch in the industry caused less accurate ratings.124 A re-
cent study by Bo Becker of Harvard Business School and Todd 
Milbourn of Washington University in St. Louis offered two possi-
ble explanations for the results, each of which has been supported 
by other research.125 First, they theorize that issuers will “shop” 
for the CRA that will rate it the highest.126 Second, they explore the 
possibility that the incentive to maintain a good reputation is dimi-
nished when more competitors are present.127 
The idea of “rating shopping” is that an issuer will seek out the 
agency that will provide the highest credit rating.128 Because differ-
ent agencies can interpret the same information differently,129 issu-
ers can seek out the agency that will provide it with the best score. 
It follows that the greater number of agencies competing, the more 
shopping options issuers will have. To adequately compete in the 
industry and offer a “better” product to their customers, the agen-
cies will force each other to provide higher—and less accurate—
ratings.130 This incentive system may please issuers, but it is con-
trary to the desires of the investors who seek reliable informa-
tion.131 Presumably, this issue is less likely to come about with less 
competition because there are fewer shopping options, meaning 
less pressure among competitors to inflate ratings.132 
                                                                                                                            
124 See, e.g., Heski Bar-Isaac & Joel Shapiro, Ratings Quality Over the Business Cycle, 108 
J. FIN. ECON. 62 (2010); Andrew Cohen, Rating Shopping in the CMBS Market (Sept. 
2011) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/events/
conferences/2011/rsr/papers/Cohen.pdf. 
125 See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 123. 
126 See id. at 6. 
127 See id. 
128 Cohen, supra note 124, at 2. 
129 Cesare Fracassi, Stefan Petry & Geoffrey Tate, Are Credit Ratings Subjective? The 
Role of Credit Analysts in Determining Ratings 2 (Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Working 
Paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230915. 
130 See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 123, at 1. 
131 See Zukina, supra note 116, at 263. 
132 See Cohen, supra note 124, at 2. 
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Becker and Milbourn’s second hypothesis involves CRAs’ rep-
utations.133 CRAs highly value their reputation.134 In fact, the for-
mer VP of Moody’s said, “What’s driving us is primarily the issue 
of preserving our track record. That’s our bread and butter.”135 
Similarly, an S&P representative claimed, “reputation is more im-
portant than revenues.”136 
Over time, data can be collected on how accurately a particular 
company can predict ratings, giving each agency a reputation.137 
Those agencies with better reputations will be more trusted by in-
vestors, making them more useful.138 Thus, issuers who are trying 
to attract investors will only retain CRAs with trustworthy reputa-
tions. 
Becker and Milbourn’s research determined that reputational 
concerns are a cause of less accurate ratings.139 They arrived at this 
conclusion by finding that agencies care less about their reputations 
when there are more competitors, and this undermines the quality 
of ratings.140 Though they did not specify why this is the case, they 
found the reputational incentives work best in modest competi-
tion.141 
Research suggests that the unique features of the CRA industry 
likely contribute to increases in competition, leading to less accu-
rate ratings.142 The three features that the CRA industry possesses 
that give rise to this phenomenon are that: (1) the field is controlled 
by three main agencies; (2) the ratings are paid for solely by the 
firms being rated and not those relying on the ratings; and (3) there 
is a basic tension between what the firms whose securities are being 
                                                                                                                            
133 See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 123, at 6 (“Our findings of reduced ratings 
quality could be related to a reputation story.”). 
134 See id. 
135 Id. at 6–7. 
136 See id. at 6. 
137 See id. 
138 See Bar-Isaac & Shapiro, supra note 124, at 2. 
139 See Becker & Milbourn, supra note 123, at 10. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See generally id. 
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rated want (high ratings) and what the consumers relying on the 
ratings want (accurate ratings).143 
This analysis is relevant in the R&R context given the similari-
ties between the two industries. Like the CRA industry, the R&R 
field is dominated by few firms,144 is compensated only by the com-
panies whose products are being rated while the consumers access 
the platform at no cost,145 and tension exists between these compa-
nies (who want high ratings) and the end-users (who want accurate 
ratings).146 The similarities are suspicious enough to raise concerns 
of competition in the industry. 
A major distinction between the two industries is that R&R 
platforms integrate their technology onto the already existing web-
sites of their customers.147 If the businesses choose, they can dis-
play the name of the R&R provider on their product review web 
page, but on other customers’ sites, the provider’s name never ap-
pears.148 Even where the R&R provider identifies itself, it is small 
and nonobvious to end-users.149 Thus, it is unlikely consumers ei-
                                                                                                                            
143 See id. at 1. 
144 See United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*23 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (recognizing that, prior to the merger, Bazaarvoice and 
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145 See id. at *8 (describing how Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews are compensated by 
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146 Compare Becker & Milbourn, supra note 123, at 5 (describing how an increase in a 
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147 BAZAARVOICE, http://www.bazaarvoice.com/solutions/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
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does not indicate that they are using Bazaarvoice technology. 
149 See Review of Weber Grill, LOWE’S, http://www.lowes.com/pd_404344-
50546510001_4294610385__?productId=3881659&Ns=p_product_qty_sales_dollar|1&
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ther notice or focus on which R&R company is providing its servic-
es. 
Because end-users are not financially liable to R&R providers, 
they lack influence in choosing a provider.150 Instead, consumers 
must use whichever technology is provided to them, and they likely 
cannot differentiate between R&R providers.151 Thus, businesses 
are free to “shop” for the provider who will give them increased 
ratings without affecting the trust of their end-users.152 
The seemingly transparent nature of R&R platforms does not 
ensure accuracy. Though a consumer may think he is receiving a 
full array of accurate ratings because he can see which reviewers 
posted and what each said, this can be misleading.153 R&R systems 
like Yelp.com use specific algorithms to filter reviews.154 The al-
leged purpose of these algorithms is to hide what might be a “fake” 
review, an untrustworthy review, or a review that the company 
paid someone to write or wrote themselves.155 It can also eliminate 
explicit and inappropriate reviews.156 However, some business 
owners contend that Yelp.com chooses to filter out good reviews if 
the establishment does not advertise with Yelp.157 
Extensive research conducted by Michael Luca, a professor at 
the Harvard Business School, finds that Yelp.com does not actually 
                                                                                                                            
pl=1&currentURL=%3FNs%3Dp_product_qty_sales_dollar%7C1&facetInfo=#BVRRWid
getID (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). 
150 See Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *5–6. 
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153 See Why does Yelp hide reviews?, WASH. POST (May 21, 2013), 
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154 See id. 
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156 Content Guidelines, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/guidelines (last visited Sept. 7, 
2014) (showing where reviews have been removed for violating Yelp’s Content 
Guidelines or Terms of Service). 
157 See Why does Yelp hide reviews?, supra note 153. 
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filter its reviews based on advertising.158 A public R&R platform 
like Yelp.com has reputational concerns to consider when devising 
its algorithm.159 The incentive to maintain a positive social image is 
absent in outsourced companies like Bazaarvoice, incentivizing 
businesses to ratings-shop.160 
High ratings over the Internet are extremely important to busi-
nesses. Luca’s research revealed that a one-star increase in a 
Yelp.com rating leads to a five to nine percent increase in reve-
nues.161 Conversely, where companies’ ratings drop, their business 
can suffer greatly.162 For example, a company called Beauty Doctor 
NV, an electrolysis spa in Northern Virginia, used to have seventy-
five customers on a typical day.163 However, when the company’s 
Yelp.com review dropped to one star, it was left with few appoint-
ments daily.164 Further, discount companies like Living Social and 
Groupon, would no longer collaborate with Beauty Doctor.165 
Businesses are incentivized to ratings-shop because of the fi-
nancial benefits of a high rating and the financial harms of a nega-
tive one.166 In a competitive environment, R&R platforms are in-
centivized to inflate ratings to satisfy their customers, because 
there are limited reputational or other restraints on R&R platforms 
encouraging them to provide accurate information.167 Whether or 
not R&R platforms are currently or purposefully providing inaccu-
rate information to consumers, they have the technology and ability 
to do so, which would make competition within the industry harm-
ful to the trusting consumers who rely upon the industry for much 
of their purchasing decisions. 
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III. AVOIDING DECEPTION 
The conflict illustrated in the above section is not to say that 
the merger between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews should have 
been allowed, or that monopolies make for a better economy. Ra-
ther, it is intended to highlight some benefits that may justify anti-
competitive behavior in the R&R industry. However, when these 
justifications are denied, our legal system must at least find a way 
to counteract the possibility of inaccurate ratings to protect con-
sumers. 
Our legal system has developed many protections to ensure 
that consumers are not deceived.168 We have laws against false ad-
vertising to help close the information gap between buyers and sel-
lers.169 We have laws regulating endorsements to ensure buyers 
know that a celebrity who is promoting a product is only doing so in 
exchange for money.170 Likewise, we need regulations in the R&R 
industry so that consumers are not tricked by seemingly accurate 
review systems. 
The R&R industry might best be suited by government regula-
tion. This section presents two possible ways that the industry 
could be regulated to protect both direct and indirect consumers: 
(1) the government can mandate product certification for R&R 
platforms to ensure that consumers are getting accurate informa-
tion; and/or (2) the government can increase transparency by re-
quiring platforms to reveal their identity as the provider of an R&R 
service, and how, if at all, the ratings and reviews are filtered. 
A. Product Certification 
Product certification is a way to expose certain attributes of a 
product, to decrease the cost of information gathering for consum-
                                                                                                                            
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (prohibiting “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce”). 
169 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0–238.4 (2014) (prohibiting bait advertising). 
170 See 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2009) (“For purposes of this part, an endorsement means any 
advertising message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, 
findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser . . . .”). 
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ers, and to make the product more transparent.171 Most often prod-
uct certification is used when consumers cannot identify the impor-
tant traits of a product even after the purchase is made.172 For ex-
ample, the organic food industry must be certified because most 
consumers will not know whether the food is organic even after 
consumption.173 The R&R industry epitomizes this concept. 
If an R&R provider were using an algorithm that skews the ac-
curacy of ratings, an end-user reading the ratings would never 
know of the deception. Imagine an end-user who purchased a 
product believing it to have a high star-count, and the consumer 
ended up disliking the product. That consumer will not likely think 
the R&R provider deceived him; rather, he will probably believe 
that his taste differs from that of the other consumers. He might be 
unhappy with the purchase, yet he will not be aware of the trickery 
used to make the sale and might continue to rely on that informa-
tion provider in the future. 
Such trickery is not condoned in our society nor well tolerated 
in our legal system. Certifying R&R products can help solve this 
potential harm. The FTC (the same body that regulates commer-
cial advertising) could certify R&R algorithms used to filter and 
display reviews to ensure that providers are conveying accurate re-
views. This option could be impractical if the algorithms are trade 
secrets of the company. However, it is possible that the algorithms 
are not trade secrets or that the FTC could somehow guarantee 
each algorithm’s secrecy. 
B. Transparency and Consumer Awareness 
The current R&R industry could be changed in two ways to 
make the systems more transparent to consumers. The first is that 
users of these systems should be made aware that an algorithm fil-
                                                                                                                            
171 See Pola Karolczyk, Product Certification – the next big standard-setting debate? 
KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2013), http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/
2013/03/14/product-certification-the-next-big-standard-setting-debate/. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. 
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ters some ratings.174 Second, consumers should know which R&R 
providers are integrated into which websites. 
Some consumers are probably unaware that R&R systems filter 
certain reviews and that these reviews are not factored into the av-
erage star rating.175 This is especially problematic when a system 
makes errors in filtering reviews or filters them for the wrong rea-
sons. Usually, this process is intended to eliminate fake reviews 
created by the company itself, or vulgar reviews.176 However, if 
consumers would like to read the filtered reviews, they should be 
readily available. 
If platforms are using filtration systems, they should be re-
quired to disclose that some reviews are filtered and clearly explain 
how the reviews are filtered. These disclaimers should be in a visi-
ble location on each review page. Further, the filtered reviews 
should be accessible to consumers, even if in another location. For 
example, Yelp.com provides a hyperlink to its filtered reviews for 
users who scroll to the bottom of each page.177 Though this does 
not necessarily make the site more transparent because a user must 
scroll through many reviews before even finding this link, it is an 
example of how consumers may be able to view filtered reviews. 
Also, consumers should be explicitly notified whether or not fil-
tered ratings factor into a product’s star-count, to avoid any possi-
ble confusion. 
Further, some consumers are probably unaware that companies 
outsource to commercial providers of R&R.178 This can be proble-
matic in attributing blames or successes of the software to the 
commercial R&R providers.179 In order to help ameliorate this 
problem, R&R providers should be required to display their trade-
mark somewhere on each review page. 
                                                                                                                            
174 See supra notes 153–156. 
175 See supra notes 153–156. 
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177 See id. 
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As discussed earlier, the credit rating industry has a strong in-
centive not to exaggerate ratings because the agencies need to 
maintain a strong reputation.180 If R&R providers are required to 
put their trademark in a visible location on each review page, con-
sumers will come to identify providers and either trust or distrust 
certain platforms. This will presumably improve accuracy of review 
algorithms, as R&R providers will have to protect their reputations. 
Admittedly, this might not improve competition among the rat-
ing agencies. However, it should provide protection to consumers 
by ensuring that the ratings and reviews that they read are more 
accurate or improving their understanding of what they are read-
ing. Both of these measures will make the platform more accounta-
ble to the consumer, balancing the two sides of the market.181 This 
accountability will likely create more accurate ratings by putting a 
reputational burden on the provider, and will give the consumer 
more information regarding the technology of the system. 
CONCLUSION 
The R&R industry might better serve society if it operates as a 
monopoly. This is because it would have the potential to create ef-
ficiencies, foster innovation, and provide more accurate ratings. 
This Note argues that the ability of R&R providers to manipu-
late ratings, the incentives they have to do so, and the fact that they 
can do so without consumers’ knowledge requires some form of 
regulation of the industry. Without such regulation, traditional an-
titrust principles are inapplicable to the R&R industry, and the Ba-
zaarvoice judgment may be victim to this, and other, fallacies. 
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181 See discussion supra Part I.C (explaining two-sided platforms). 
